The article describes the main indicators of the functional safety systems, which are related to the safety of technological processes. There is also an evaluated example in accordance with the recommendations of the standards IEC61508 and IEC 61511. In this paper, we analyzed their dependence on the organization of maintenance and diagnosis of these systems.
INTRODUCTION
The management of functional safety is the most important part of the standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 [BS IEC 61511. 2003 ]. Applications of all companies, which include some of the steps of the life cycle, must handle the Process Safety Management (FSM) system. FSM system should specify the management and technical activities necessary to achieve the desired functional safety. We shall demonstrate satisfying life cycle, processes to be used, responsibilities and privileges of individuals, departments and organizations, available verification form and validity check, etc. It is necessary that all activities will be carried out by this process, so that they can be controlled. All decisions should be made in a way that they are clear and could be easily identified.
SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVELS
The intention of FSM is to prevent and avoid disruptions of the safety devices built into the system, and to avoid distortions in the operation and maintenance of technological equipment. Legislative standards focus on the management of all activities that are necessary to ensure the safe application design and operation of the equipment or its installation itself. Serious risks to the equipment and to any related management systems should be defined by the supplier or manufacturer by analyzing operational safety. The analysis determines whether the functional safety is required to ensure adequate protection of all significant risks. This should be properly taken into account when designing the system. Functional safety is just one of the methods for working with risks. There are also other methods to eliminate or reduce risks. For example, own safety is extremely important as a part of the design.
Standard (IEC 61508) applies to safety-related systems, only if one or more of these systems includes electrical, electronic or programmable electronic device (E / E / PE). This standard relates to the potential danger caused by failure of safety functions performed by E / E / PE systems and is related to ensuring their safety.
With regard to the security, the standard refers to the whole E / E / PE system (starting from the sensor, with the use of logic control devices and communication systems, to the final actuator, including all relevant actions taken by a human operator). The long-term health damage, including damage to the environment, which is harmful to health in the long term, clearly falls within the scope of this standard (IEC 61508-4) and is included in the safety concept.
Some of the required safety functions and corresponding performance levels are determined by the risk analysis and the operational safety (IEC 61508-5). The equivalent analysis of environmental risks and financial risks can be accomplished by setting the security in the field of the environment or financial parameters. Like any other part of the system, software safety integrity level does not exist in isolation from the safety-related system. The software, which is integrated into the system, can maintain the safety function at a certain level of security depending on its purpose, configuration, implementation and verification.
The standard IEC 61508 describes two operating modes associated with the functional safety. This is about a low demand mode and a high demand mode or a continuous mode of operation. These terms are formally defined in paragraph 5.3.12 of IEC 61508-4.
Before a security system starts, it must be proved by calculation that the supplied security system meets and complies with SIL. There are several methods for calculating the level of achieved integrity. The first parameter, which determines the level of integral safety SIL (Safety Integrity Level), is the average probability of failure PFD (Probability of Failure on Demand). The factor in reducing the risk of RRF (Risk Reduction Factor), which is the ratio of the incidents without protective measures divided by permissible frequency of incidents, is the variable PFD , RRF . That means, that if the number of cases without a protective actions is 10 per year, and the acceptable number of cases is equal to 1 per 100 years, then RRF should be equal to 1000, respectively PFDAVG = 0,001 annually. This value is in accordance with the standard IEC 61508 and corresponds to the safety SIL 2. The risk of the failure, leads to a loss of functionality of the security system or to a loss of a safe state. During a failure state the system can be considered as safe, when it leads to the incorrect output stop and to the break of the technological process (false tripping) with regard to the systems which are normally in the "on" state (eg.
Safety systems). Dangerous failures are those, which prevent disconnection of the output and stop the process in case of emergency. Each category is further divided into detectable (λ sd, λ dd ) and undetectable (λ su, λ du ) on-line diagnostics.
The reverse value λ s is MTBF s , or the average time (in years) between the possible false stops. On the other side, the reverse value λ d -MTBF d is the average time (in years) between potentially dangerous disorders.
DETERMINATION OF THE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF A FAILURE
Determination of the different categories of a failure is generally carried out at the design stage of specific equipment (e.g. Sensor -temperature converter with the current output 4 … 20mA is tested for the determination of λ sd , λ su , λ dd , λ du . We are using the estimation, that the transmission range variation of the temperature measurement is 0.8mA (5% of operation margin). Table 2 and table 3 Where RT is the time of recovery in hours (usually 8 hours), TI is the time interval between the functional screening tests in hours (1 -5 -10 years, 1 year = 8.760
hours) and is labeled as Tproof.
is the intensity of detectable dangerous failures.
is the intensity undetectable dangerous failures. For T i =1 year = 8760 h and Figure 3 shows the PFD and PFD avg of 1oo1 system architecture and the interval TP roof , which is equal to 1 year. Where PFD is the probability of the implementation of the failed queries to perform safety functions except of the diagnostics tests to detect the undetectable faults. PFD avg is the average probability of failing of the safety functions queries, with regard to the implementation of the diagnostic tests.
There are special procedures for diagnostic tests to detect the intensity of dangerous undetectable failures ∑ for each unit, which are detectable by conventional diagnostic on-line tests. If we do not want to perform regular tests, then the value PFD of the safety functions SIF will be moved from current level to a lower level.
Mode with low query intensity: in this mode the frequency of the safety function queries is not more than one query per year and not more than double frequency of screening tests.
-Mode with high query intensity: in this mode the frequency of safety function queries is not more than one query per year and more than double frequency of screening tests.
The amount of screening tests shows the frequency of performing functional tests of the safety systems, so it is possible to guarantee their functionality. For the mode with low query intensity, the given values correspond to the time interval of one year. Because one year has approximately 10000 hours, the PFG avg values in both modes are approximately the same.
CONCLUSION
It should be noted that the decrease of the risk factor RRF is the reverse value of PFG avg . To assess SIL levels, it is easier to use RRF factor, because the positive integers are more intuitive. When assessing the SIL levels, we should note:
The values from the table 4 applies to the safety functions of SIF as a whole and not to its parts -The difference between two SIL levels is 10. The same difference of one order (10) exists between the minimal and maximal values for each SIL level. For example, RRF = 120 SIL2 and RRF = 980 also applies to SIL2, but there is a big difference between them. These two values cannot be compared, even though both apply to the SIL2.
There is one misunderstanding that the SIL levels (1 -2 -3 -4), which are defined to instrumental function of safety system, are the same. This is however not correct, because the safety SIL levels depend on the probability PFD, which increases over time. SIL level remains constant only for certain period of time TP roof . TP roof is a time interval between screening tests of the system security. The interval is usually 1, 3, 5, 10, 15 years (Ti parameter).
-SIL level , which corresponds to the 1 year test interval is significantly different from the level which corresponds to the 10 year test interval, even though both belongs to the same safety function.
-There are two ways to improve SIL quality of specific SIF: lowering the test interval TP roof and using the redundant components, or combination of both methods
